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ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
A lecture delivered by
C. Mangrum, USMC
at the Naval War College
August 15, 1949

Col. Richard

Important changes were made in the whole structure for
national security when Congress passed the National Security
Act of 1947. During the past two years most of us in the armed
forces have become more or less familiar with these changes and
with their impact on all phases of military operations.
As you know, the President has recently signed another bill
entitled "The National Security Act Amendments of 1949." It is
particularly timely, therefore, to discuss the Organization for Na
tional Security in the light of these newest changes with which
we must also become familiar.
All of us urgently need to. understand what is going on. If
I can indicate how some of the pieces of the puzzle fit together,
we may be better able to see the present Organization for National
Security as a whole picture. During the year you will have the
opportunity to examine the picture in more detail.
At the Naval War College graduation ceremonies last May,
Under Secretary of the Navy Dan A. Kimball made some significant
and challenging remarks.
"The very nature of the National Military Establishment
is being altered at the top and all of you will be remiss in
your duty if you do not endeavor to comprehend what
these changes mean."
Colonel Mangrum is a member of the Naval War College Staff.
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"The trend is now toward closer and more intimate con..
trol at the center, a control that goes far beyond policy.
This means, naturally, less flexibility of action for the
man on the spot. If you are to function properly under
these new conditions you must give them cool and studious
reflection, and more than that, you must apply yourselves
with care to working within the limitations they impose."
It very patently behooves us, therefore, to see what these

new conditions are and what new kind of organization this is, if

we are to operate usefully within it.

The National Security Council.
Under the general title, Organization for National Secur

ity, I wish to discuss first the agencies which are outside of the
Department of Defense and responsible directly to the President.
The first of these is the National Security Council.
The Council brings together officially the civilian heads of

those Federal agencies which are largely responsible for our na

tional security.

The permanent membership of the Council now

consists of the President, the Vice-President, the Secretary of

State, the Secretary of Defense, and the chairman of the National
Security Resources Board. The changes recently made in the law

added the Vice-President, and removed the three service secretaries.
The President has authority, subject to the advice and consent of
the Senate, to add other members on a temporary basis, and he

has added Secretary of the Treasury Snyder. Mr. Sidney Souers is
the executive secretary of the Council.
The function of the Council is to advise the President with

respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military pol
icies relating to the national security.

In brief, it outlines and at

tempts to correlate our foreign policy with our military policy.
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sees that our foreign policy does not involve commitments that are

beyond our capabilities, or, if it does involve such action, that we
accept it as a calculated risk.

We won a great victory in World War II, only to find that

after liberating a good part of Europe from one totalitarian regime,
it is quickly falling under the influence of another. Political critics
believe that

if we had had a national objective-if we had known

what we were after-such a situation would not have arisen.
There is a certain amount

of substance to that criticism.

The

formation of a National Security Council should prevent the re
currence of errors in foresight, provided that it functions the
way it should and it appears to be functioning that way now.

This does not mean that the State Department has abdi

cated any of its responsibilities. Secretary of State Acheson and

his department still have the central responsibility for formulating
important decisions at top policy levels.

The National Security

Council provides assurance that decisions are made only after a

thorough-going estimate of the situation has been made.

The State Department assumes the leadership role in the

charting of foreign policy. Yet the process allows the men in the

Pentagon-and also spokesmen for the domestic economy-to
know what is going on, and to contribute their views before an

issue is finally decided.

The composition of the Council gave rise to considerable

concern over possible military domination of our foreign policy.

These fears may be somewhat allayed by the removal of three

of the four civilian heads of the military departments. As a mat

ter of practice, matters that come before the Council are referred
to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a military point of view. The Joint

Chiefs are said to confine themselves very definitely to a military
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point of view, so there seems to be not too much cause for concern
about military domination of our foreign policy. In any event, it is

sheer folly to imagine that policy can be made in these times with
out reference to the immediate realities of the strategic situation.
The President has personally attended about a fourth of the
Security Council sessions, which usually take place every two weeks.
Whether he attends or not, the deliberations of the Council are
brought to his desk within twenty-four hours by Mr. Souers and
the President takes prompt action on the recommendations which
have been made. Most authorities now seem to feel that the Na

tional Security Council is making a material contribution to our
security and to our foreign policy.

Central Intelligence Agency.
Under the National Security Council we have the Central

Intelligence Agency. It is established for the purpose of coordinating
the intelligence activities of the several Government agencies and
departments in the interests of national security. There is no in
tention that Central Intelligence should supersede departmental in
telligence. As Admiral Hillenkoetter, the Director, says:
"We couldn't get along without the departmental agencies.
They are our biggest suppliers as· well as our best custom
ers. CIA would be a head without a body if it did not
have them."
The CIA has no police, subpoena, law enforcement, or in
ternal security functions. The Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which does have these functions, operates only in the domestic
field. The FBI is required by law to make available to the CIA
anything which may be essential to national security. Again to para
phrase Admiral Hillenkoetter-"they work very closely together."
The function of the CIA, in brief, is to obtain information

16
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which concerns the national security, correlate it, evaluate it,
and disseminate the results to those who need to use it. Thus,
it serves not only its principal, the National Security Council, but
all other appropriate agencies of the government as well.
National Security Resources Board.

On the same level as the National Security Council we have
the National Security Resources Board. It is also directly responsi
ble to the President. It's membership consists of the Secretaries
of State, Treasury, Defense, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and
Labor, and a Chairman appointed by the President.
The job of the NSRB is the allocation of the human and
material resources of the nation in furtherance of a war effort.
It advises the President concerning the coordination of mili
tary; industrial, and civilian mobilization. It has no direct com
mand function. The board provides the nuclei, which in time of war
would be expanded into such offices of economic command as an Of
fice of War Manpower, Office of Economic Stabilization, Office of
Economic Warfare, Office of War Transportation, Office of Price
Administration, and so on.
Part of the NSRB's "Preliminary Plan for Economic Mobili
zation" is the drafting of emergency legislation to provide the
President with emergency powers, and for the creation of these
economic commands.
The delays in the mobilization of this country in World War
II would have been disastrous had our Allies not acted a1:1 a buffer be
tween us and the enemy while we organized our resources. The
Congress has presently foreseen that if the nation is to be bet
ter prepared in the future to defend itself against aggression, it
is necessary to plan our economic command -beforehand.

17
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It is important to maintain the clear distinction between
the NSRB and the Munitions Board, which comes directly under the
Secretary of Defense. The two Boards work closely together. The
Munitions Board consolidates

the requirements of the Armed

Services and sends them to the NSRB. When the NSRB has allocated

certain resources to the military establishment, the Munitions Board
handles the detailed arrangements for the use of this allocation.

I shall have more to say about the Munitions Board later on.

Mobilization planning must be continuous. The Security

Act recognizes the interdependence of strategic and economic

planning. The NSRB and the Munitions Board together are as

sembling the data for testing the economic feasibility of strategic

plans developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Quick approximations

will be made of military requirements on 240 items which the

Munitions Board believes will represent a significant percentage of

total requirements. The NSRB, with the aid of other government de

partments, will develop estimates of the requirements of the in

dustrial and civilian economy. Total requirements will be compared

with estimates of resources so that, within a short time, the Board

can tell the military establishment the degree to which its strategic
plan is feasible.

The two chief criteria for unification efforts were to be ef

ficiency and economy.

The key function of the NSRB is the ef

fective wartime use of resources, balancing military and civilian

requirements. Wartime effectiveness is the ultimate goal. It may

be necessary in times of international tension, as well as in war

time,· to forego economies and administrative efficiencies which

could be achieved under purely peacetime conditions� Conversely,

it may be necessary to sacrifice somemobilization.potential to meet
i

budgetary realit es. during peacetime;.._in which case, economies

and administrative efficiencies are invoked, not by military choice;,
but through practical necessity.

l8
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There is some difference of opinion about how things are
going in the NSRB (as indeed in the whole organization for Nation
al Security). Mr. Bernard Baruch recently quarreled with the
White House about the extent of, or lack of, mobilization planning.

At present the NSRB does not have a permanent chairman. The
President has not yet submitted a new nomination as chairman
since Mr. Wallgren was turned down by the Senate Armed Services
Committee. Mr. John Steelman, of the President's Staff, is acting
chairman.

The National Security Resources Board, the National Se
curity Council, the CIA, and the Department of Defense constitute
the present structure for National Security. If we are to under

stand fully the structure of the Defense Department itself, it is im

portant to have thorough-going recognition of the functions of
these other agencies. They are the political and economic balance
wheels for the military.

The Department of Defense
The Department of Defense is a 15 billion dollar insurance
business in this fiscal year 1950. No one in this room is unaware
of the fact that the policy holders haven't been too happy about
the way the business is being run. They seem to have the idea
that the directors could reduce the cost of this insurance by large

percentages if only they would leave their brass knuckles outside
the board of directors' room and agree on everything. One school of
thought would simply hand all the brass knuckles over to one in

dividual who would use them only when necessary, of course, but for
the common good.

The record shows, however, that much progress has been
made in two years under new management. It is a different kind of
management and not easy for people either in or out of the service
to understand quickly. Habit patterns change slowly.
19
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A quote from the conclusion of one of the speeches by the
late Mr. Forrestal is to the point:
"I do not wish to leave with you the impression that the
job is done. It is far from done and it will be a sub
stantial time before it is. I say to you quite frankly that
I have preferred to make haste slowly, because I have had
constantly in mind that we are charged with a heavy
and great responsibility-the security of the nation. In
the process of achieving a new form of organization, we
must be sure we retain the capacity to fight successfully.
Charts cannot win battles."
Let us turn then to an examination of what composes this
job of reorganization as specified by the National Security Act.
First, what did the Congress intend to do? The Declaration
of Policy in the Act is short and it will be useful to keep it in
mind. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 2. In enacting this legislation it is the intent of
Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the
future security of the United States; to provide for the
establishment of integrated policies and procedures for
the departments, agencies, and functions of the Govern
ment relating to the National Security;
to provide three military departments for the operation
and administration of the Army, Navy, (including naval
aviation and the Marine Corps), and the Air Force, with.
their assigned combat and service components;
to provide for their authoritative coordination and unified
.direction under civilian control of the Secretary of Defense
but not to merge them; *
*Italicized portions indicate additions to this section by the Na
tional Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216).

20
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to provide for the effective strategic direction of the armed
forces and for their operation under unified control and
for their integration into an efficient team of land, naval
and air forces, but not to establish a single Chief of Staff

over the armed forces nor an armed forces general staff,
( but this is not to be interpreted as applying to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff or Joint Staff). *
This is, of course, an attempt to improve the

administration

of National Security.

Regarding administration, Mr. Reginald Gillmor, former

Vice-Chairman of the NSRB and for many years president of the

Sperry Corporation, has some timely things to say. He speaks of an
"Ultimate Science", as old as history, which has no name but whose

objective is order; order among men; order which will permit their
free cooperation and the release and use of all their varied talents
and skills.

The instruments for this potential science of order are known

by such terms as government, management, organization, and ad

ministration. Administration is the broadest of these terms and

can, therefore, be used to include all the others.

In brief, he says, the two political ideologies into which the

world is divided are primarily two ancient and mutually antagonistic

concepts of administration.

One, the centralization concept, based on the assumption

that the governing organization is omniscient and that the best re
sults will be attained if all others obey its will.

*Italicized portions indicate additions to this section by the Na
tional Security Act Amendments of 1949 (Public Law 216).
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NATIONAL SECURITY

COUNCIL

PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.
VICE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SECRETARY OF STATE
CHAIRMAN , NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
OTHER DEPARTMENT HEADS, AS REQUESTED
EXECUTIVE SEC.: SIDNEY W. SOUERS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR: R. ADM. R.H. HILLENKOETTE R

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

ARMED FOR CES POLICY COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN (MILITARY)
CHIEF OF STAFF , ARMY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF, AIR FORCE

SEC. OF DEFENSE, CHAIRMAN
DEP. SEC, OF DEFENSE
SEC. OF ARMY
SEC. OF NAVY
SEC· OF AIR FORCE
CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

UNIFIED
FIELD
COMMANDS

DEPARTMEN ,:
SECRETARY: GORDON GRAY
UNDER SEC. : TRACY S.VOORHEES
T HE ASST. SEC.:
49-31

ASST. SEC. : ARCHIBALD S. ALEXANDER
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NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD
ACTING: JOHN R. STEELMAN
HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND
AGENCIES OR THEIR REPRE

SENTATIVES, AS DESIGNATED
BY THE PRESIDENT

11',EARLY
1.. LER)

MUNITIONS BOARLJ
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVILIAN)
VACANT

UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE ARMY
UNDER OR ASST. SEC. OF THE NAVY
UNDER OR ASST. SEC- OF THE AIR FORCE

RESEARCH 8 DEVELOPMENT BOARD
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD (CIVldAN)
KARL T. COMPTON
ARMY
NAVY

}

AIR FORCE

'THE NAVY

DEPARTMENT OF T HE AIR FORCE

SP. MATTHEWS
, KIMBALL

SECRETARY: W. STUART SYMINGTON
UNDER SEC,: ARTHUR S. BARROWS
ASST. SEC,:

,KOEHLER

TWO REPRESENTATIVES
FROM EACH, TO BE NAMED
BY THE SECRETARIES

ASST. SEC, : EUGENE M. ZUCKERT
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The other, or decentralization concept, based on the as
sumption that the governing organization is a ministry for provid
ing order and that the best results come from the maximum of
delegation and individual freedom.

So, the new organization for national security can be said

to be a foray into the field of this "ultimate science" with a greater
degree of order as its objective. Mr. Gillmor's definitions may
help to explain why the road we are traveling has not been without

its bumps.

The Secretary of Defense
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 makes the
Defense Department an Executive Department of the Government.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments are no longer execu

tive departments. They are now military departments of the De
partment of Defense. The three service secretaries retain their
titles but they no longer have Cabinet status and are now clearly
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense.

'The Office of Under Secretary of Defense was established
in April of this year and Mr. Stephen T. Early is the first incumbent.
The title of this office has now been changed to Deputy Secretary
and he takes precedence over the three service secretaries.
The principal changes effected in the Secretary's Office by
the Amendments Act clarify Mr. Johnson's authority to direct and
control. He is now provided with direct authority over the military
budget.

The 1947 Act provided for three Special Assistants to the
Secretary. These special assistants are now given the rank of As

sistant Secretaries of Defense and they take precedence next after

24
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the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
There probably will be some internal changes in the organi

zation of these offices, but it is too soon to tell what they may be.

Until the present time, the three special assistants have presided

over such offices as :

Office of Counsel
Office of Legislative Liaison
Office of the Budget
Office of Accounting Policy
Office of Progress Reports and Statistics
Administrative Office and Secretariat
Mr. McNeil's Office of the Budget is, of course, a vitally im

portant function in the new Secretary's Office. The 1950 budget is

the first to be submitted in accordance with the National Security
Act. It was bound to run into many new administrative difficulties.

These are particularly sharpened because of the colossal size of the
military budget compared to the remainder of the Federal Budget.

In a lecture at the National War College last year, Mr.

McNeil said, relative to the problems of his Office of the Budget:
"The concepts of what should comprise the budget function
may be as numerous as the number of agencies or the num
ber of people asked to comment on the subject. They would
range from the concept that the budget's primary job is
procurement of funds, to the other extreme wherein the
budget function dictates to all phases of operations. My
own concept of the budget function is that it should be
much more than a procurement device. It must be an ef
fective tool for management."

25
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The influence of the budget on the whole organization of the
Department of Defense, and indeed, on national objectives and na
tional strategy, cannot be minimized. It is well to try to understand
all that we can of the principles which underlie the. new adminis
tration of the military budget.

This is a good place to mention, briefly, another of the
changes recently effected. Title IV of the 1949 Amendments Act
contains various provisions all of which are intended to implement
the Secretary's authority over the military budget, and to revise
the whole fiscal structure. While it is a vitally important provision of
the new law, it can be excluded from this discussion of organization.
The Act also provides that one of the new Assistant Secre
taries shall be the Comptroller of the Department of. Defense. The
Office of Comptroller is also established in each military department.

Armed Forces Policy Council.
Dropping down now from the Office. of the Secretary, let's
see who advises or works for the Secretary. First, there is an ad
visory body, the Armed Forces Policy Council. This was formerly
called the War Council. It's name and composition have been changed
by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act
It now consists of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy
Secretary, the three service secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs and the three Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Council advises the
Secretary on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces.
Examples are the military aid program, and policy under certain

budget cuts.

We don't need to spend much time on the Policy Council.
It should be noted, however, that the Secretary of Defense is Chair
man of the Council and the law provides him with power of decision.

26
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This gives force to his position, and in a sense, gives him direct com
mand powers, emphasizing the trend toward the "centralization con
cept."

Joint Chiefs of Staff.
We should take µp next the organization of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Joint Staff. All the remaining activities of the Depart
ment of Defense are conditioned by the work of the Joint Chiefs.
It should be noted and remembered that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff actually were an outgrowth of the Combined Chiefs of
Staff. Here, the military leaders of sovereign nations met to formu
late broad strategy and programs · for World War II. To insure
prior agreement among U. S. members, it was necessary that they
first meet together for preliminary discussions. Thereafter, they
became known as the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
No legislative or executive action was taken to formalize the
existence of the JCS until passage of the National Security Act of
1947. The absence of any specific charter gave great flexibility to
the organization and allowed it to develop according to need as the
war progressed.
The National Security Act incorporated the JCS organiza
tion into law approximately as it existed at the end of the war�
The Act preserves the Joint Chiefs' status as the principal military
advisors to the President; and gives· them a similar status with
respect to the Secretary of Defense.
Now, ·.the office of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
has · been ,created� He takes· precedence over all ,other officers , of
the- armed services, but does· not have military command' over the
Joint Chiefs or of any .of the :military services. Heis the:presiding:

2'
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officer and provides agenda for meetings of the Joint Chiefs, and
assists them to prosecute their business promptly. He has no vote
in Joint Chiefs decisions, however. It is also his job to inform the
Secretary of Defense and, when appropriate, the President, when
the Joint Chiefs cannot agree on an issue.
The functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are summarized
as follows:

(1)

Preparation of strategic plans and prov1s10n for the
strategic direction of the military forces.

(2)

Preparation of joint logistic plans and
logistic responsibilities.

(3)

Establishment of unified commands.

(4)

Review of material and personnel requirements.

(5)

Formulation of policies for joint training.

(6)

Formulation of policies for coordinating military education.

(7)

Provision for representation on Military Staff Committee
of the U. N.

assignment ,of

One of these functions, you will note, is the establishment
of unified commands in strategic areas when such commands are
in the interest of national security. Initially, unified commands
were set up where possible hostile action might require a single
commander who could act without waiting to hear from Washing
ton. Time and experience have proven that it is necessary to go
even further in the delegation of authority to these unified com
manders. This is required mainly in the logistic field in order to
secure greater unification of both manpower and material. It is
evident that the unified command plan is here to stay as the means
of directing offensive operations in time of war.

28
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At present, there are six unified commands. These are: Far
East, Pacific, Alaska, Carribean, Atlantic, and Europe. The Com
manders-in-Chief of these commands report directly to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Three other commanders also report directly to
the Joint Chiefs-the Commanding General of the Strategic Air
Command, the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, Austria, and the
Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization has two major ele
ments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committees and the Joint Staff.
The Committees are charged with the preparation of plans for the
JCS. The committee members are officers whose primary assignment
is with the Department of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. The chair
man of each committee is a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff.
The three principal committees are-Strategic Plans, Intelligence,
and Logistic Pians.
The Joint Staff is headed by a Director and consists of 210
officers, the limit under present law. They are drawn equally from
the three services, and their sole duty assignment is to the Joint
Staff. The Joint Staff is divided into three main Groups, Strategic
Plans, Intelligence, and Logistic Plans, and each Group is headed

by the Deputy Director of the Joint Staff who is also chairman of
the related committee. The relationship between the groups and
their parent committees is substantiallly the same as the re
lationship between a commander and his staff.

The size of the Joint Staff precludes it from becoming a

fact-finding body in its own right, and it depends, therefore, upon

information received from fact-finding agencies, boards, and com

mittees of the services. Joint Committees under the Joint Staff

Director have been organized for this purpose. For example, the

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1949
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Joint Communication-Electronics Committee is composed of the
senior officers of the communications components of the three serv
ices; namely, the Chief Signal Officer of the Army, the Chief of
Naval Communications, and the Air Force Director of Communica
tions. This committee is concerned with establishing common com
munications procedures and doctrines.
The most difficult of the several types of strategic plans
which the Joint Chiefs must face is the outline war plan for
Mobilization Planning and Industrial Mobilization Planning. If we
consider this type of plan for a moment, you will see the extent to
which the whole Defense Department is dependent on the proper
production of such plans by the Joint Chiefs.
It must be. understood, first, that the outline war plans of th�
JCS are not detailed operational plans. The outline strategic plan,
as such, consists of four essentials:
(1) A statement of national war objectives.
(2) Statement of enemy capabilities
(3) A broad general concept of operations, and
(4) A statement of a number of time-phased military
tasks to be undertaken by our forces, including state
ment of the major tactical units to perform the tasks.
This outline war plan for Mobilization Planning and In
dustrial Mobilization Planning forms the basis for the Mobiliza
tion Plans of the three services, and for the Joint Mobilization
Plan. It is, in fact, the basis for the work of the Munitions Board.
Thus, you can see that things must move along smoothly in the
Joint Chiefs' office if anybody else is going to do his work properly.

30
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Munitions Board

This is a good point at which to move our discussion along
to the Munitions Board. The Munitions Board ·must have the phased
requirements of the . three Mobilization Plans for end products,
raw materials, industrial installations and facilities.
Thereafter, in order to avoid the possibility of doing a lot
of unnecessary work on Industrial Mobilization Planning for a
strategic plan which is too fat for the industrial capacity of the
country, the Munitions Board conducts an industrial feasibility test
early in the planning cycle.
To do this, they choose about 240 of the more important end
products and get "flash" estimates of these requirements from
the services. These are compared with estimates of industrial
plant capacity.
It might be said, by way of summar1zmg the foregoing,
that in the logistic field the Joint Chiefs are responsible for deter
mining the "what", "where", and "when", and the Munitions Board
the "how".
It would require too much detail to explore further the
functioning of the Munitions Board. Members of the Board are
the Under or Assistant Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air
Force, with a civilian chairman appointed by the President.
The Board clearly possesses certain executive authority,
stemming from the Secretary of Defense. It differs in this respect
from the National Security Resources Board. Those who criticize
the weakness of the NSRB seem to fear that the Munitions Board,
as part of the Department of Defense, would usurp the_ functions of
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the NSRB if war should come suddenly, and that the national econ.
omy would thereby come under military domination.

Research and Development Board
So much, then, for the major planning and directing agen
cies of the Department of Defense. The last statutory agency created
by the National Security Act of 1947 is the Research and Develop
ment Board. This board is an outgrowth of the Joint Board created
in 1946 by the Secretaries of War and Navy.
The Board consists of a Chairman, appointed from civilian

life by the President, and two representatives from each military
department. The present chairman is Dr. Karl T. Compton. The
Board is our means of keeping abreast of scientific discoveries and
of finding military applications for them. The chief responsibility of
the Board is to prepare integrated programs of research and devel
opment, in the light of which the individual projects of the Army,
Navy and Air Force can be evaluated. The Board decides who de
velops what weapons. It makes sure that there is no unnecessary
duplication in the activities of the three services.
The Board operates principally through its twenty odd
committes, covering the whole broad field of science. The commit
tees are composed of top-ranking civilian scientists, officers of the
three services, and representatives of other government agencies.
The Research and Development Board is, then, a staff
agency of the Secretary of Defense, to insure maximum exploitation
of the scientific potential of the nation. Both the Research and De
velopment Board and the Munitions Board are affected in the
same way by the National Security Act Amendments of 1949. The

authority of the Secretary to direct and control is clarified, and the
responsibility of both·Boards to the Secretary is made specific.
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In view of the high cost of research and development, the

Board gave serious consideration to evaluating weapons and
weapons systems at an earlier stage. As a result of its recommenda
tions, the Secretary of Defense established the Weapons Systems

Evaluation Group last December. This Group takes its direction

from the Secretary but is now responsive to both the Research and

Development Board and the Joint Chiefs. The directive which es

tablished the Group provided that after one year of organization
and trial, it would become a component of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This is a good example of the many evolutionary processes

that have been going on in the Organization for National Security
in the past two years.

Conclusion
Each of the several agencies of the Organization for Na

tional Security provides ample material for study which is import
ant to us here. As a matter of fact, you will hear visiting speakers

from a number of these agencies during the year.

I have summarized what,we might call the staff and command

aspects of the Organization for National Security. The three mili
tary departments complete the structure and you will hear about

them in presentations to follow.

This presentation was designed simply to highlight the re
lationships between the various parts of the organization and pro

vide an introduction-a point of departure for your own further
study.

This is the way things are today. I mentioned earlier that

not everyone was satisfied and happy with this new organization. No
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doubt further changes will be proposed in time. If the past is any
criterion, we can probably expect strong differences of opinion on
new proposals to alter the structure.
I will conclude this presentation, then, by referring again to
Mr. Kimball's admonishment of last May"You will be remiss in your duty if you do not endeavor
to comprehend what these changes mean."
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